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THE “NEW CONSENSUS” AND THE POST-KEYNESIAN APPROACH TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY TRAPS 
 
 
1.- Introduction  
The most salient feature of the institutional framework that characterizes most, if 
not all, present-day OECD economies is that the central bank (hereafter CB) fine-tunes 
the economy through conventional monetary policy actions with a view to achieving an 
inflation target in the medium-term. We define the former as the regular actions that 
characterize the day-to-day setting of short-term nominal rates by the CB. However, the 
latter are subject to a zero lower bound (hereafter ZB). This constraint arises because, in a 
money-using economy, individuals will not be willing to hold any financial asset other 
than money when the nominal yield of the former is equal or less than zero. Its existence 
may cause a “liquidity trap” (hereafter LT), i.e., a situation where the CB is unable to 
push real interest rates down far enough so as to keep inflation constant in the absence of 
supply shocks.1 The existence of the ZB has been well-known for a long time. Yet, it has 
only been of recent that mainstream economists have focused their attention on it. 
Research on the causes and policies to deal with a LT has been led mainly by proponents 
of the “New Consensus” in macroeconomics (hereafter NC).2 Two events explain, 
according to us, this phenomenon. First, it has become much clearer, especially since the 
early 1990s, that CBs fine-tune the economy through changes in interest rates rather than 
through changes in the monetary base. Second, there is the protracted period of sluggish 
growth and deflation experienced by the Japanese economy since the 1990s and its 
attribution by some prominent scholars to the occurrence of a LT (Krugman, 1998; 
Svensson, 2005).  
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 The main contribution of this study is to identify a number of key differences in 
the diagnosis of the occurrence of a LT in the NC and the Post-Keynesian (hereafter PK) 
approach. According to us, the crucial difference is that, in the former, a LT is viewed as 
a fairly rare and transitory situation which may emerge in the wake of large adverse 
shocks that depress the “neutral” or “natural” interest rate. By contrast, in the PK 
approach, an economy may also exhibit a “structural” or long-lasting LT. This will be the 
case if a perverse combination of high precautionary saving, low investment spending by 
firms, and stringent bank credit conditions for firms and households alike stemming from 
a high degree of liquidity preference makes the sum of the steady-growth “neutral” 
interest rate and the inflation rate fall short of the term premium on long-term interest 
rates.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a formal definition of a 
LT and identifies the factors that may engender it within a general framework. Section 3 
reviews briefly the NC approach taking the influential contribution in Woodford (2003) 
as a benchmark. Section 4 expounds the PK approach to the explanation of the LT vis-à-
vis the NC approach. Section 5 expounds a simple PK macroeconomic model for a closed 
economy without a government sector that illustrates the PK position with regard to the 
occurrence of a “structural” LT. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.- The liquidity trap 
A LT is usually defined as a situation in which the real interest rate (in a closed 
economy without a government sector) at which saving at the employment rate consistent 
with constant inflation and investment would be equal is negative (Krugman, 1998, p. 
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150). In a LT conventional monetary policy becomes ‘impotent because nominal interest 
rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because 
base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes’ (Krugman, 1998, 
p. 141). If we denote by ω  the minimum (ex-ante) actual real interest rate that a CB can 
set and by rn  the “neutral” interest rate, we may define a LT as a situation where: 
                                                     ωprn                                                                (1)    
where rn  is the long-term real interest rate which is neutral with respect to the inflation 
rate and tends neither to increase it nor to decrease it in the absence of supply shocks If 
we think of r as a long-term interest rate, then ω  will be positive because lenders will 
require a time-varying term premium 0fμ  either to grant credit or to purchase long-
dated securities.3 Post-Keynesians insist that the time-varying nature of μ  stems from 
changes in the degree of “liquidity preference” (hereafter LP) of investors and financial 
intermediaries respectively (see, for instance, Wells, 1983, p. 533). Next, if we assume, 
for simplicity, that the expected rate of inflation equals the actual inflation rate we have: 
                                                     πμπμω −=−= e                                                      (2)                               
Therefore, we say that an economy is in a LT if:  
                                                           μπ p+rn                                                               (3) 
Expression (3) tells us that the lower are rn  and π , and the higher is μ  the more 
likely it is that an economy will exhibit a LT in the wake of either a favorable supply 
shock or an unfavorable demand shock that pushes π  and rn  down respectively. Finally, 
if we replace rn  in (3) by the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate, then we say that the 
economy exhibits a “structural” or long-lasting LT.  
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3.- The liquidity trap in the “New Consensus” approach 
A large number of mainstream economists have recently evaluated the likelihood 
of economies exhibiting a LT and the policy options that may remove this constraint. 
Two recent Symposiums are devoted to this topic; the 2000 Symposium on ‘Monetary 
Policy at the Zero Lower Bound’ published in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 
and the 2004 Symposium on ‘Policies to deal with deflation’ published in the American 
Economic Review. A summary of the former is in Blinder (2000) and an evaluation of the 
different proposals is in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). An aspect these studies address is 
the possibility that the economy enters a deflationary spiral once the ZB binds. The 
general verdict is ‘that such episodes are fairly rare, even in a low-inflation environment 
― about once every hundred years if the target rate of inflation is around zero, given the 
sort of shocks that have characterized the U.S. economy over the past thirty years’ 
(Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, p. 962). Hence, the general impression is that a 
deflationary spiral episode may solely come about in the wake of unusually large shocks. 
Conversely, there is no consensus as to whether unconventional monetary policy options 
can sort a LT out should it be necessary. Several policy options to deal with a LT have 
been proposed but, as argued in Reifschneider and Williams (2000, p. 943), a summary of 
the debate is that ‘the likely effectiveness of such actions is unclear from a theoretical 
perspective, and they have never been put to a definitive test’.  
If the conventional wisdom is that a deflationary episode may solely arise in the 
wake of unusually large transitory shocks, we may wonder why this is so. A first reason 
is clearly empirical; there has been only one example of an OECD economy experiencing 
something like a deflationary episode over the past seventy years, Japan in the 1990s. A 
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second reason is related to the mainstream notion of the “natural” interest rate. For the 
purpose of expounding it, we take the study by Woodford (2003) as the canonical version 
of the NC approach. Woodford (2003) expounds a fully-fledged model based on explicit 
optimizing foundations where the deviation of the “natural” interest rate from its steady-
growth value is a stochastic process determined by a range of demand and supply shocks. 
He defines the “natural” interest rate as ‘the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of 
fully flexible prices’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 248) and names his approach “neo-wicksellian” 
because output-gaps and, hence, changes in the inflation rate are explained by deviations 
of the actual real interest rate from the “natural” interest rate. In the “extended” version of 
his model demand shocks include fiscal policy, investment and “impatience” shocks. The 
latter modify the rate of time preference of the representative household. Supply shocks 
consist of productivity shocks to the production function of the representative firm, 
shocks to the disutility-of-labor function and changes in the amount of physical capital. 
He concludes that real ‘interest rates must increase in response to temporary increases in 
government purchases or in the impatience of households to consume and decrease in 
response to temporary increases in labor productivity or in the willingness of households 
to supply labor’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 250). Importantly, he admits that a range of shocks 
may render the “natural” interest rate negative, although he implies that this will be a 
transitory situation: 
   
  ‘The present theory allows for variation over time in the natural rate for a variety 
of reasons, and there is no reason why it should not sometimes be negative. (The model 
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does imply a positive average level of the natural rate, determined by the rate of time 
preference of the representative household)’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 251, emphasis added).   
 
To this date, there is no presentation of the NC model couched in a growth setting 
so we need to make use of “optimal” growth theory to extrapolate Woodford´s results to 
a growing economy. According to it, the optimality condition for saving yields the 
following “balanced growth” condition: 
                                            ϑσ ++= n
a
r*                                                            (4) 
where r*  denotes the steady-growth “natural” interest rate, a denotes the rate of labor-
augmenting technological change, n denotes the rate of population growth, σ  denotes the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and ϑ  denotes the rate of time 
preference of the representative household.4 Since a and n will be positive in a growing 
economy, r*  is positive and its lower bound is ϑ . Finally, in the stationary state we have 
that 0== na  and, hence, ϑ=r* .  
Woodford´s assumption that the average “natural” interest rate is positive implies 
that the former returns in the long-run to a positive gravitation center provided prices are 
fully flexible. He does not explain verbally the process whereby the “natural” interest rate 
converges to its gravitation center. The argument presumably is the following. Let us 
suppose the “natural” growth rate is zero so that the steady-growth “natural” interest rate 
initially equals the rate of time preference. If an adverse shock subsequently drives the 
“natural” interest rate down far enough so as to make the economy exhibit a negative 
output-gap, inflation will decrease. As long as the inflation rate remains positive or 
slightly negative, the CB can lower the nominal interest rate so as to make the actual real 
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interest rate fall short of the (average) rate of time preference. Next, the “permanent 
income hypothesis” (hereafter PIH) embedded in the standard NC model predicts that, for 
a given permanent income, current consumption will increase relative to consumption in 
the previous period if the actual real interest rate is lower than the rate of time preference 
and vice-versa. Meanwhile, households´ permanent income will remain constant in spite 
of reduction in current income since, due to the “perfect foresight” assumption embedded 
in the standard NC model, it is assumed to depend on future (exogenous) potential output 
(Clarida et al., 1999, p. 1675). Consequently, as current consumption increases relative to 
permanent income, the (negative) output-gap will narrow and the “natural” interest rate 
will increase. This process will continue as long as the actual real interest rate falls short 
of the rate of time preference. Eventually, the actual and the “natural” interest rate will 
equal the (average) rate of time preference and the output-gap will be zero.5  
Several comments are in order. First, the function of the “natural” interest rate in 
the NC approach is equivalent to the “neutral” interest rate as defined above, namely, the 
real interest rate compatible with constant inflation in the absence of transitory supply 
shocks since, as Woodford (2003, p. 248) notes, ‘the natural rate of interest is just the real 
rate of interest required to keep aggregate demand equal at all times to the natural rate of 
output’. Second, as recognized by proponents of the NC, an economy that exhibits low 
inflation and a negative output-gap may enter a “deflationary cycle” whereby a decrease 
in inflation endogenously raises the level of the real rate causing aggregate demand to 
weaken and push inflation down more, thereby raising the real interest rate even further 
(Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, p. 942). Thus, if a deflationary spiral is to be avoided, 
proponents of the NC approach need to assume that the adjustment process described 
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above will not be short-circuited by the adverse effect upon aggregate demand of a rising 
actual real interest rate.6 Finally, from the previous discussion we may be tempted to 
conclude, as Woodford apparently does, that a LT may only occur when the “natural” 
rate becomes negative. However, as expression (3) above highlights, a LT may also come 
about when the “neutral” interest rate is positive. This will be the case when, for a given 
inflation rate, the term premium becomes large enough so as to satisfy (3). In this respect, 
Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) introduce a number of modifications to the standard NC 
model to allow for a time-varying spread between rates offered to depositors and paid to 
borrowers. Notwithstanding the improvement in terms of realism, they fail to recognize 
that the spread may change endogenously and, crucially, in the opposite direction as the 
“neutral” interest rate due to changes in the degree of LP.  
 
4.- The Post-Keynesian approach to liquidity traps  
The thrust of our presentation of the PK diagnosis of a LT focuses on the 
possibility that the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate may become negative and, 
consequently, the LT may become a “structural” or long-lasting one rather than a 
“transitory” phenomenon. This, in turn, has deep economic policy implications. In 
particular, we will argue below that the adjustment of consumption described in the 
previous section as predicted in the joint rational expectations-PIH (Hall, 1978) may be 
short-circuited for reasons other than the setting off of a deflationary spiral. The argument 
is three-fold. First, there is the typical Keynesian assertion about the impact of current 
disposable income and firms’ profits on current consumption and investment spending 
respectively. This means that adverse demand shocks may elicit “effective demand 
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failures” whereby output becomes the adjusting variable. Second, we will show that the 
maximization of households´ lifetime consumption profile subject to a lifetime budget 
constraint that lies at the heart of the arbitrage process described above may, under 
uncertainty about future income, lead to an equilibrium where the steady-growth 
“neutral” interest rate falls short of the rate of time preference of the representative 
household and may become negative. In particular, we show that, even if there is no 
credit-rationing, an increase in uncertainty will reduce aggregate demand due to (i) an 
increase in precautionary saving (ii) and low investment and that this, in turn, may reduce 
potential output growth. Finally, we show that the presence of financial intermediaries 
like banks who face illiquidity and default risk will tend to exacerbate the adverse effects 
on aggregate demand of uncertainty.           
 
4.1.- Effective demand failures 
To make our point clear we take advantage of Leijonhufvud’s well-known theory 
of “effective demand failures” (Leijonhufvud, 1973). According to it, the central issue in 
macroeconomic theory is the extent to which the economy may properly be regarded as a 
self-regulating system in which there is an adequate coordination of desired sales and 
purchases at the market level in the sense that there are powerful homeostatic 
mechanisms whereby all market excess demand and supplies are eliminated. He 
distinguishes between two types of feedback mechanisms: deviation-counteracting and 
deviation-amplifying mechanisms. In the former, the larger the displacement from the 
equilibrium, the stronger will be the homeostatic tendencies working to bring the system 
back. In the latter, the opposite is the case.  
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Primary examples of neoclassical deviation-counteracting feedback mechanisms 
are the adjustments in the composition of aggregate demand prompted by changes in real 
interest rates as predicated in neoclassical loanable funds theory or the changes in the 
level of aggregate spending that result from the operation of the “real balance” effect. 
Examples of multiplier-repercussions are the effects of changes in current income and 
capacity utilization on current consumption and investment demand respectively. For our 
purposes, the presence of deviation-amplifying mechanisms implies that the “neutral” 
interest rate will exhibit autocorrelation even when (exogenous) shocks do not exhibit it. 
As a result of it, the “neutral” interest rate will exhibit a higher variance as opposed to a 
scenario where such mechanisms do not exist.7 The variance of the “neutral” interest rate 
is not a determinant of the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate in the NC approach 
owing to the presence of assumptions like (i) the identification of households´ permanent 
income with future (per capita) potential output and (ii) perfect creditworthiness of all 
borrowers. Contrastingly, in the PK approach, higher output volatility leads to more 
precautionary saving and credit-rationing, higher term premiums, lower investment and, 
hence, a lower steady-growth “neutral” interest rate. Indeed, it may be argued that the 
existence of phenomena like precautionary saving and credit-rationing is inextricably 
linked to the presence of strong deviation-amplifying mechanisms that may drive current 
output away from potential output for long periods of time.     
 
4.2.- Precautionary saving 
Consumption appears to track household current disposable income much more 
closely than predicted by Friedman’s PIH (Friedman, 1957). This is normally attributed 
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to (i) households’ permanent income being sensitive to changes in current income and (ii) 
the presence of liquidity constraints. According to the joint rational expectations-PIH 
(Hall, 1978), the individual’s permanent income and, therefore, his consumption plans 
will be revised period by period as new information about future income becomes 
available. The magnitude of the revisions in response to the realization of the current 
innovation in income in a given period will be proportional to the latter. Following this 
approach, Flavin (1981) specified a structural equation relating the change in current 
disposable consumption to the contemporaneous revision in permanent income (modeled 
using the income innovation) and the change in current income. The coefficient of the 
change in income is thus a measure of the marginal propensity to consume out of current 
income (MPC) and, therefore, the joint rational expectations-PIH can be tested by testing 
whether the MPC is significantly different from zero. Her empirical results indicate that 
the observed sensitivity of current consumption to current disposable income is much 
greater than is warranted by the PIH, even after controlling for the role of current income 
in signaling changes in permanent income. Likewise, a number of empirical studies show 
that some groups of households are subject to liquidity constraints. For example, Jappelli 
and Pagano (1994) investigate whether cross-country differences in liquidity constraints 
can explain cross-country differences in the aggregate saving rate and find that the former 
are important to the latter. The observed excess sensitivity of permanent income to 
changes in current income and the presence of liquidity constraints represent crucial 
deviation-amplifying mechanisms that are completely absent from the NC model. As 
noted above, the former is a direct consequence of the “perfect foresight” assumption 
whereby revisions in permanent income made in response to changes in potential output. 
 13
This means that, at the aggregate level, there is the equivalent of Say´s Law whereby an 
increase in expected future potential output brings about an equivalent increase in current 
and future aggregate spending (see Palacio-Vera, 2005). In turn, the absence of liquidity 
constraints in the NC model stems from the assumption of (i) perfect financial markets 
and (ii) the “transversality” condition whereby there is no default risk and all borrowers 
are deemed creditworthy (Goodhart, 2007).    
Next, Friedman (1957) repeatedly acknowledged the importance of precautionary 
saving motives induced by uncertainty about the future level of labor income. In contrast, 
the crucial assumption that allowed subsequent mainstream theorists to solve their formal 
maximizing models was that income uncertainty had no effect on consumption either 
because uncertainty was assumed not to exist ― like in the “perfect foresight” model that 
characterizes the NC approach ― or because the utility function took a special form that 
ruled out precautionary motives ― like in the “certainty equivalent” model in which, 
consumers are assumed to have quadratic utility functions. In addition, Friedman (1957) 
asserted that the “permanent income” that determined current spending was something 
like a mean of the expected level of income in the very near term and that households 
adopt a much shorter “horizon” than the remainder of their lifetimes. Finally, Friedman 
indicated that the reason why distant future labor income had little influence on current 
consumption was “capital market imperfections”, which included both the fact that future 
labor income was uncertain and the difficulty of borrowing against such income.  
According to Carroll (2001, p. 25), the main development in consumption theory 
in the last two decades is that substantial improvements in computer speed have allowed 
economists to relax the perfect foresight/certainty equivalence assumption and to analyze 
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optimal behavior under realistic assumptions about uncertainty. In particular, if 
consumers are “impatient”, in the sense that if there were no uncertainty or liquidity 
constraints they would spend more than current disposable income and “prudent” in the 
sense that they have a precautionary saving motive, then the existence of uncertainty 
about future income entails that the level of consumption of a representative household 
will, for every possible level of wealth, fall short of the level of consumption implied by 
the “perfect foresight” consumption model. Buffer-stock behavior arises because 
impatience makes consumers want to spend down their assets, while prudence makes 
them reluctant to draw down assets too far. Precautionary saving is thus defined as the 
amount by which consumption falls as a consequence of uncertainty.8 
Another consequence of the existence of uncertainty is that ‘as wealth approaches 
infinity, the proportion of future consumption that will be financed out of uncertain labor 
income approaches zero, so income uncertainty becomes irrelevant to the consumption 
decision’ (Carroll, 2001, p. 32). This implies, as Keynes (1936) argued long ago, that rich 
people spend a smaller proportion of their income than poorer people. Technically, this 
means that the consumption function under uncertainty is strongly concave (Carroll and 
Kimball, 1996). The concavity property thus implies that consumers engage in “buffer-
stock” saving behavior whereby wealth becomes a “reserve” against uncertainty. As 
shown in Carroll (1992), there will be some target level of wealth such that, if actual 
wealth is greater than the target, impatience will outweigh prudence, precautionary 
saving will decrease and wealth will consequently fall, whereas if wealth is below the 
target, precautionary saving and wealth will increase. In other words, the concavity 
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property implies that precautionary saving increases the marginal propensity to consume 
out of transitory income shocks since the former relaxes as wealth rises.  
The strongest claims on behalf of the precautionary motive come from the work 
of Carroll (1992). According to him, unemployment expectations are important 
determinants of consumption because ‘when consumers become more pessimistic about 
unemployment, their uncertainty about future income increases, so their target buffer-
stock increases, and they increase their saving to build up wealth toward the new target’ 
(Carroll, 1992, p. 62). His simulations show that, contrary to standard life-cycle and 
permanent income models: (i) even with unchanging expectations about the average 
future level of labor income, increases in the expected probability of unemployment or a 
tightening in the borrowing constraints facing households will make them increase their 
target wealth and saving rate; (ii) the elasticity of the saving rate with respect to the 
growth rate of personal labor income is positive; (iii) the interest elasticity of saving is 
approximately zero.  
The precautionary demand for saving can thus be described as the extra saving 
caused by future income being random rather than determinate. Under certainty we have 
the well-known result in consumption theory that consumption will be growing when the 
real interest rate is greater than the rate of time preference, and declining when the real 
interest rate is less than the rate of time preference. However, as noted in Deaton (1992, 
p. 29), ‘if the marginal utility of consumption function is convex, a mean-preserving 
increase in risk will increase the marginal utility of future consumption, so that current 
consumption will have to decrease in order to bring the current marginal utility back into 
equality’. Hence, convexity of the marginal utility function provides a rationale for the 
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precautionary demand for saving.9 In a seminal paper, Leland (1968) considers a two 
period model of consumption in which income in the first period and a subjective 
probability distribution for income in the second period are known. The consumer must 
determine his consumption for the first period before he knows the actual value of his 
second period income. He is interested in the level of saving as future income becomes 
more uncertain about a given expected (mean) value and finds that, under reasonable 
assumptions, the optimal saving rate of households under uncertainty is higher than under 
certainty and the higher the degree of uncertainty, the greater will be the optimal saving 
rate (see also Sandmo, 1970, p. 356). In particular, he shows that, under uncertainty, the 
Euler equation becomes: 
                              ( )[ ] ( )cu
r
cuE ttt '1
1'
*
0
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+
+
ϑf     if  ϑ=r*0                                   (5) 
where ( )cu t'  is the marginal utility of consumption c in period t, ϑ  is the discount factor, 
and E is the expectations operator. The existence of an inequality in the Euler equation 
(5) stems from the fact that, as uncertainty increases, households´ expected marginal 
utility of future consumption increases relative to the marginal utility of current 
consumption. Hence, optimizing households will want to reduce current consumption. 
Nevertheless, an alternative adjustment in the previous Euler equation is that there exists 
a real interest rate ϑ=rr *0*1 p  such that, in equilibrium: 
                                  ( )[ ] ( )cu
r
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+
+=+ ϑ                                                  (6) 
and the greater the degree of uncertainty about future income the larger the gap between 
ϑ  and r*  that will be necessary to reach equilibrium. Thus, if ϑprr *1=  households will 
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not have any incentive to reduce saving further even though the actual real interest rate 
falls short of the rate of time preference. The theory of precautionary saving also provides 
a rationale for the Keynesian claim that, even if expected future income remains constant, 
an increase in uncertainty may elicit an increase in households´ saving despite the actual 
real interest rate being negative.  
One might object that a similar result could be obtained if, instead of an increase 
in uncertainty, there is a decrease in permanent income. Certainly, a decrease in expected 
future income relative to current income will increase the expected marginal utility of 
future income thereby creating a wedge between ϑ  and rn  in the absence of adjustments 
in current consumption. However, the downward revision of permanent income cannot 
last indefinitely. Eventually, households will stop revising it. When this occurs, they will 
increase current consumption (relative to consumption in the previous period) as long as 
the actual real interest rate falls short of their rate of time preference and this, in turn, will 
tend to close the gap between ϑ  and rn . Hence, this story can solely account for the 
emergence of a temporary gap between ϑ  and rn .10 By contrast, when a gap between ϑ  
and r*  emerges in the aftermath of an increase in uncertainty, the former will stay put as 
long as the latter remains high.     
Lastly, we have assumed so far that the rate of time preference of all households 
is positive. Nevertheless, as Irving Fisher (1930) noted long time ago, there may be some 
occasions when this does not hold: 
 
‘The man’s income situation is such that he might even be willing to lend for 
nothing, or even less than nothing, simply because he would, in such a case, be so 
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surfeited with this year´s income and so short, prospectively, of next year´s income that 
he would be thankful to get rid of some of this year´s superfluity, for the sake of adding 
even a trifle to next year´s meager real income… In such situations a man would be 
willing to save for the future without any incentive in the form of interest’ (Fisher, 1930, 
p. 248). 
   
 It is straightforward to associate the case mentioned in Fisher´s quote above with 
increases in uncertainty about future income, that is, there may be households whose 
future income becomes so uncertain that, for all purposes, it is “as if” their rate of time 
preference were negative. Crucially, if the rate of time preference of some households 
becomes negative in some circumstances, it is no longer the case that the average rate of 
time preference in the economy will always be positive.      
 
4.3.- Investment  
Post Keynesians insist that firms´ investment is mainly a function of current and 
expected profitability. The impact of expected future profits in investment spending 
recognizes the possibility, as Keynes (1936) does, that long-period profit expectations 
may shift independently of strictly economic results like current gross profits.11 The 
impact of current profits in firms´ investment spending stems from the fact that: (i) as 
proposed in the Kaleckian tradition changes in current profits affect expected profitability 
and the cost of external finance (Fazzari and Mott, 1986–87) and, (ii) there is an 
extensive literature that claims that firms´ investment expenditure is significantly affected 
by changes in firms´ cash flows (Fazzari et al., 1988; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). This 
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literature is generally based on the premise that capital markets are imperfect in the sense 
that internal and external capital are not perfect substitutes so that investment may 
depend on financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, access to new debt 
or equity finance, or the functioning of particular credit markets. In turn, the main source 
of imperfections is the presence of asymmetric information that makes it very costly, or 
even impossible, for providers of external finance to evaluate investment opportunities. 
As a result of it, the cost of new debt and equity may be substantially higher than the 
opportunity cost of internal finance generated through cash flow and retained earnings. 
The impact of cash flows on investment thus constitutes an important deviation-
amplifying mechanism that reinforces the mechanism that operates through consumption.  
 
4.4.- Credit-rationing 
In the real world many economic agents are liquidity-constrained in the sense that 
they do not have sufficient assets to sell or the ability to borrow. Samwick (1995) shows 
that unconstrained consumers who exhibit a precautionary saving motive behave in ways 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the behavior of liquidity-constrained consumers 
facing no uncertainty. To be sure, liquidity-constrained households exhibit less flexibility 
in responding to shocks since the effects of the shocks cannot be spread out over time. In 
addition, precautionary motives and liquidity constraints interact because the inability to 
borrow when times are bad provides an additional motive for accumulating assets when 
times are good, even for impatient consumers (Deaton, 1991). This means that 
uncertainty will have a bigger effect on expected utility for liquidity-constrained agents 
than for unconstrained ones. The precautionary saving motive is thus heightened by the 
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desire (in the face of uncertainty) to make such constraints less likely to bind (Carroll and 
Kimball, 2001). In short, in the “buffer-stock” saving model, a tightening in borrowing 
constraints brings about an increase in precautionary saving or, alternatively, it widens 
the wedge between r*  and ϑ .  
Next, the usual PK assumption regarding expectations formation is that borrowers 
and lenders are subject to “fundamental” uncertainty about the future (Keynes, 1937, p. 
113). By such, is meant the idea that the future cannot be reduced to an actuarial 
calculation of probabilities, whether objective or subjective. In this setting, the analysis of 
past data or current market signals does not provide reliable information regarding future 
prospects and therefore, the future is simply not calculable (Davidson, 1991). They also 
argue that, in many choice situations more can be learned about the factors governing 
eventual outcomes after decisions have been made. This presents no problem where 
choices can be completely and costlessly reversed. But things are very different where 
they cannot. Such irreversibility entails that it may sometimes be rational to suspend 
judgement and delay commitment until more information has been acquired. In this 
context, the function of liquidity is that of “giving us time to think” (Hicks, 1974, p. 57). 
In general, however, decisions cannot be postponed until all the evidence is available and, 
in such cases the readiness and terms at which commitments to previous choices may be 
dissolved assumes importance (Runde, 1994, p. 136). Thus, in situations of uncertainty 
liquid assets carry a premium over illiquid ones. In short, Post Keynesians identify the 
notion of LP with an environment of “fundamental” uncertainty where the degree of LP 
is inversely related to the degree of confidence and the reliability of beliefs. In turn, this 
implies that reduced LP typically accompanies conditions which are conducive to 
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increases in the level of economic activity and vice-versa. As discussed above, 
precautionary saving and expected profitability are two channels through which higher 
LP may reduce aggregate demand. In addition, Post Keynesians insist that decisions by 
banks as to whether or not to grant credit play a major role in the expansion of the 
economy, in the sense that a failure of banks to supply credit will imply that the 
expansion of expenditure cannot occur:12  
 
‘A world of ultimate liquidity preference is a world where firms would refuse to 
produce for fear of indebtedness, where banks would refuse to lend for fear of loan 
defaults, and where consumers would refuse to spend for fear of unemployment’ (Lavoie, 
1996, p. 292).  
 
The usual PK argument is that banks accommodate all creditworthy demands for 
credit, and ration all those demands not deemed creditworthy. In addition, it is postulated 
that there is always some credit-rationing and that the former increases in recessions due 
(mainly) to increases in the degree of LP of banks which, in turn, exacerbates output 
contractions. The earliest reference to credit-rationing in the PK literature is Keynes´ 
comments in the Treatise (Keynes, 1930, p. 212) about the “fringe of unsatisfied 
borrowers”, the size of which can be expanded or contracted so that banks can influence 
the volume of aggregate spending over the business cycle. The upshot is that the “fringe” 
represents a permanent situation in the sense that there is always a group of borrowers 
who are refused credit.13  
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For the purposes of this study, two questions naturally arise. First, does credit-
rationing actually increase in recessions and, if so, why?. Second, does the occurrence of 
cyclical changes in credit rationing makes it more likely that a “structural” LT comes 
about?. According to Wolfson (1996, p. 451), ‘all that is necessary for a theory of credit 
rationing based on Keynesian uncertainty is that borrower and lender evaluate the future 
differently — that is, they have asymmetric expectations’ about the riskiness of particular 
projects whose outcome depends on the future. In particular, for those projects deemed 
safe by the borrower but deemed too risky by the lender, the borrower will be rationed. In 
turn, this means that the impact of credit rationing at any point in time can be ascertained 
by computing the number of projects deemed safe by the borrower relative to the number 
of projects deemed too risky by the lender. It is not controversial to say that banks tend to 
increase both price and non-price terms in response to perceptions of higher risk and that 
perceived risk increases in recessions. However, it will also be the case that the demand 
for bank credit decreases in recessions. Be that as it may, Wolfson (1996, pp. 459-61) 
shows empirical evidence that suggests that interest rate spreads, non-price standards and 
credit rationing increase altogether near business-cycle peaks and decrease near troughs. 
Why is this so?.  
Banking firms need to reach a compromise between profit maximization on one 
hand and illiquidity and default risk on the other hand. An increase in lending by an 
individual bank (to creditworthy borrowers) relative to lending by the rest of the banks 
leads, in normal circumstances, to higher expected future profits for that bank but also 
brings about a decrease in its reserves to capital ratio and its reserves to deposits ratio. 
The specific balance an individual bank reaches will depend on its degree of LP which, in 
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turn, will depend on its state of confidence. By this, we mean ‘how highly we rate the 
likelihood of our best forecast turning quite wrong’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 148). According to 
Keynes (1936, p. 152), even though we know we do not know the future, we tend to act 
as if we do by relying on conventions. The former represent the non-technical vision of 
economic agents. As uncertainty increases, agents will ‘place less trust in the past as a 
guide to the future and become more wary of irreversible commitments that increase the 
threat of illiquidity’ (Dymski, 1992, p. 317). In general, the weaker the state of 
confidence is, the more likely it is that opinion will change. In turbulent times like 
recessions conventions break down and change. In turn, a turbulent time comes about 
when there is a significant amount of dissonance between agents´ anticipations about 
cash flows and ex post realizations (Minsky, 1975).14 As for banks, an increase in 
“turbulence” will bring about a perceived change in borrowers´ creditworthiness that will 
change their conventional valuation of the risk of lending and, hence, the size of interest 
rates spreads and the extent of credit rationing. 
The last question we address is whether the existence of credit-rationing and 
“fundamental” uncertainty renders the occurrence of a “structural” LT more likely. As 
noted above, banks tighten credit standards and set higher interest rate spreads before 
business cycle peaks. This will tend to reinforce the deviation-amplifying mechanisms 
alluded to above by exacerbating the response of current consumption and investment to 
decreases in current disposable income and profits respectively. First, households who 
are not subject to binding liquidity constraints will increase precautionary saving. 
Second, households or firms who are subject to binding liquidity constraints will not be 
able to maintain, let alone increase, current spending even if the actual real interest rate 
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falls short of the rate of time preference or the expected profit rate respectively. The 
convergence of the “neutral” interest rate to the (average) rate of time preference will 
thus be short-circuited so the former will settle at a level that is inversely related to the 
degree of uncertainty and credit-rationing.    
To finish off this section, we should like to note that the PK approach stands in 
marked contrast to the standard NC approach where the assumptions of “perfect” capital 
markets and creditworthiness of all borrowers imply the absence of credit-rationing:  
 
‘Amongst the several problems/disadvantages of this current consensus is that, in 
order to make a rational expectations micro-founded model mathematically and 
analytically tractable it has been necessary in general to impose some (absurdly) 
simplifying assumptions, notably the existence of representative agents, who never 
default. This latter (nonsensical) assumption goes under the jargon term as the 
transversality condition’ (Goodhart, 2008, p. 13).   
 
Admittedly, there are attempts to render the standard NC model more realistic by 
introducing household heterogeneity and interest rate spreads (Cúrdia and Woodford, 
2008; Canzoneri et al., 2008).15 However, as Goodhart (2007) notes, some fundamental 
problems like the absence of default risk and credit-rationing remain to be addressed. 
 
5.- A simple Post-Keynesian model 
We now expound a simple PK model for a closed economy without a government 
sector. We intend to utilize it as a benchmark to be contrasted to the NC model. We 
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display the model in the first two subsections and present the analysis of its steady 
growth properties and short-run behavior in subsequent subsections.  
 
5.1.- The supply side 
Let us consider a one-sector economy with two inputs, labor and capital, and 
assume that (i) there is a large number of identical firms and (ii) they all utilize the same 
technology. If we aggregate across all firms, we may define potential output Y as: 
                                                       KvNY ⋅≤⋅= λ                                                       (7) 
where N  denotes the level of employment that keeps inflation constant in the absence of 
transitory supply shocks, K denotes the aggregate capital stock, and λ  and v denote 
respectively the productivity of labor and capital when the factors are fully utilized. The 
current rate of capacity utilization is: 
                                                         1≤⋅= Kv
Yu                                                            (8) 
where Y denotes aggregate output. We assume there is an “employment rate compatible 
with constant inflation” (hereafter CIER) which results from the conflicting income 
claims of workers and firms so that inflation will increase if the actual employment rate is 
higher than the CIER and vice-versa. Thus, the CIER represents a short-run “inflation 
barrier” albeit one which may be affected by the level and time path of aggregate demand 
if it exhibits hysteresis effects. We define the rate of capacity utilization when YY =  as 
the “constant inflation capacity utilization” or CICU which we denote by u or: 
                                           1≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⋅==
K
Le
vK
N
vvK
Yu λλ                                     (9) 
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where we denote the by e  the CIER, by L the labor force and LeN ⋅= . For simplicity, 
we assume there is no overhead labor and firms are fully integrated, producing all the 
materials required for their final output so that prime costs are made up only of labor 
costs. We also assume that firms set a constant mark up over prime costs. Finally, the 
“natural” rate of growth is:                                                
                                                             angn +=                                                          (10) 
where a  is the growth rate of labor productivityλ .  
 
5.2.- The demand side 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market for a closed economy without a 
government sector when current output is equal to potential output is: 
                                                          IYzrs n =⋅),(                                                      (11) 
where s is the saving rate, I is (gross) investment, and z is a vector of variables to be filled 
below. rn  is the “neutral” interest rate which we define here as the real interest rate that 
makes planned saving at potential output equal to planned gross investment. It is better 
thought of as a long-term rate. If we divide (11) through by K and denote the rate of 
capital accumulation by g and the rate of depreciation of physical capital by ψ  we get: 
                                                         ψ+=⋅⋅ guvs                                                       (12) 
We now turn our attention to functions s and g. We assume that the saving rate s 
is a function of the rate of inflation π , the rate of growth of output yˆ , the real interest 
rate r and a measure of shocks ε s  that includes changes in the degree of LP or:  
                                            ),,ˆ,( επ sryss =                                                       (13) 
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where 0ˆ fsy , 0psπ , 0fsr , ε s  is a stochastic variable and the subscripts in function s 
denote partial derivatives. As noted above, a positive sign of s yˆ  is an implication of the 
“buffer-stock” theory of saving.16 However, it is here justified by Marglin´s (1984) 
“disequilibrium hypothesis” according to which household saving relative to disposable 
income increases when income rises faster than households can adapt their spending 
habits whereas the opposite occurs when income falls faster than households can rein in 
their spending. We also noted above that the “buffer-stock” theory of saving predicts a 
negligible elasticity of saving with respect to the interest rate. By contrast, the positive 
sign of sr  is here attributed to the presence of distribution effects rather than to the 
optimizing behavior of households. If we assume that the average propensity to consume 
of net debtors is higher than that of net creditors, then a rise in the real interest rate will 
redistribute income away from net debtors and towards net creditors thereby raising the 
aggregate saving rate.17 The sign of sπ  is attributed to the presence of consumption delay 
effects and inside-debt effects that depress private spending when inflation decreases and 
vice-versa.18     
Next, let us assume that firms have a desired rate of capacity utilization 1* pu  so 
they expand productive capacity when uu *f  and stop expanding it when uu *p .19 A 
theoretical justification for this assumption is that firms prefer to keep some capacity idle 
in order to be able to respond rapidly to unanticipated favorable demand shocks and  
deter the entry of rivals into the industry (Spence, 1977). This can be conveniently 
captured by defining the rate of accumulation, g as: 
                                        ),( * ε guufuvg −⋅⋅=                                                  (14)             
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where 0ff u  is inversely proportional to the size of the construction and capital goods 
delivery lags, 0)0( fff = , 0)( =ε gE  and ε g  represents shocks affecting f . Parameter 
f  captures firms´ expected future demand growth and, hence, expected profitability. In 
turn, we assume that the investment function f adopts a linear form or:20 
                                             )(),( ** uuffuuf ug −⋅+=− ε                                       (15) 
Inserting (14) into (12) we obtain the equilibrium condition in the goods market 
when YY =  or:  
                                
uvu
ufrys gsn
ψεεπ +−= ),(),,ˆ,( *                                     (16) 
Next, we assume that the saving function s adopts a linear form or: 
                                     rssysss ry ⋅+⋅+⋅+= ππˆˆ                                            (17)                                 
where s  is a shift term determined by households´ preferences, institutional factors, and 
the degree of LP. If we insert (15) and (17) into (16) and re-arrange, we obtain the (short-
run) rate of growth of output:  
                                        
uvss
rssuufsfy
yy
ru
⋅⋅+
⋅−⋅−−⋅+−=
ˆˆ
*)(
ˆ ψππ                               (18) 
Finally, rn  is the real interest rate that yields uu =  in the short run. A solution 
for rn  can be obtained by setting uu =  in (18) and rearranging:21 
                      
s
sysuvu
ufsf
r
r
yu
n
πψ π ⋅−⋅−⋅+−⋅+−=
ˆ)( ˆ*
                           (19) 
Therefore, an increase in the degree of uncertainty will tend to raise s  and lower 
f  thereby pushing rn  downward and vice-versa. 22 
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5.3.- Steady-growth analysis  
 Steady-growth equilibrium corresponds to a period of sufficient length to enable 
all variables in the economy to settle at constant rates in the absence of new disturbances.  
If we denote by π *  the inflation target of the CB we have that, in a hypothetical steady 
growth scenario, gy n=ˆ , uuu *== , ππ *=  and 0=== εεε πgs  so that the two following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
                                                       ygfuv n ˆ
* ==⋅⋅                                                     (20) 
and                                          ψπ +=⋅⋅ guvrgs nn *** ),,(                                             (21) 
 Equation (20) tells us that, in steady-growth, the rate of accumulation must equal 
the “natural” growth rate. Equation (21) is the counterpart to equation (12) for the steady 
growth case. In order to get an explicit solution for the steady-growth “neutral” interest 
rate r*  we insert (17) into (21) and re-arrange: 
                                         
s
gsss
uv
g
r
r
y n
n 1
ˆ
*
*
* ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⋅
+= πψ π                                         (22) 
Thus, r*  is a function of the “natural” rate of growth, the target inflation rate, the 
depreciation rate and the saving rate. It can be interpreted as the real interest rate where 
‘all markets are in equilibrium and there is therefore no pressure for any resources to be 
redistributed or growth rates for any variables to change’ (Archibald and Hunter, 2001, p. 
20). It follows that:                                                            
                                                            01
*
p
ss
r
r
−=∂
∂                                                     (23) 
so that, for instance, an increase in precautionary saving pushes r*  down and vice-versa. 
Likewise, a decrease in the “natural” growth rate will push r*  downward: 
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Therefore, unlike in the NC approach, r*  may become negative if g n  is very low 
and s  is relatively large. In this respect, it has been argued that the main cause of the 
recent Japanese stagnation is its relatively high saving rate and its low “natural” rate of 
growth (see, for instance, Krugman, 1998, pp. 173-4 and Nakatani and Skott, 2007).23 
Finally, Post Keynesians insist that the “natural” growth rate is a positive function of the 
growth of aggregate demand.24 This means that, if sustained for a sufficiently long period 
of time, a low investment rate may push the “natural” growth rate down and, through this 
channel, it may reduce r* .       
 
6.- Summary and conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to identify the distinguishing features of a Post-
Keynesian (PK) approach vis-à-vis the New Consensus (NC) in macroeconomics with 
respect to the explanation of the occurrence of a “liquidity trap” (LT). We characterized 
the NC approach by Woodford´s (2003) influential study which predicts that a LT is 
likely to be a transitory phenomenon that may solely occur as the result of relatively large 
shocks that (temporarily) depress the “natural” interest rate. We showed that this is an 
implication of the neoclassical premise that there is a positive gravitation center towards 
which the “natural” interest rate converges in the long run. However, we argued that such 
convergence is based on unrealistic assumptions about economic agents´ behavior and 
the institutional framework in which they make decisions like the assumptions of perfect 
foresight, perfect capital markets and absence of credit-rationing. By contrast, we showed 
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that, in the PK approach, all agents face the risk of default and make decisions under 
conditions of “fundamental” uncertainty about the future. As such, we showed that the 
main implication of the PK model vis-à-vis the NC model is that economies may exhibit 
“structural” or long-lasting liquidity traps. This will be the case, for instance, if a perverse 
combination of high household saving, low investment and stringent conditions for 
access to credit stemming from a high degree of liquidity preference makes the sum of 
the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate and the inflation rate fall short of the term 
premium on long-term interest rates. Finally, the main policy implication stemming from 
the PK vis-à-vis the NC model is that, even if a deflationary spiral does not set off, the 
economy may remain stuck in a LT for long periods of time unless forceful expansionary 
policy measures are duly implemented.   
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1 The traditional Keynesian presentation of the LT refers to a situation where the demand for money 
becomes infinite at a (low) positive long-term nominal interest rate owing to the behavior of speculators in 
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the bond market (see Kregel, 2004). By contrast, Krugman (1998) refers to the LT as an episode in which 
the output-gap is negative despite the short-term nominal interest rate becoming zero.    
    
2 Expositions of the NC can be found in Clarida et al. (1999) and Meyer (2001) and a recent critical review 
is in Arestis and Sawyer (2008).  
  
3 Woodford (2003, p. 244) notes that ‘it is a long-term real rate of interest rather than a short rate, that 
determines aggregate demand in this model’ and he refers to agents´ expectations about future short-term 
real interest rates as key determinants of aggregate demand. 
 
4 For this example, we assume “constant relative risk aversion” preferences of the representative household 
and that the utility of each future generation is weighted equally irrespective of size.  
 
5 The introduction of endogenous capital accumulation in the “basic” model (see Woodfrod, 2003, ch. 5) 
does not affect this story. In practice, investment is introduced in terms of the expansion of the capital stock 
that is required to underpin a predetermined potential output path so it does not play an “independent” role.  
  
6 A deflationary spiral may not necessarily set off when the economy exhibits a LT. For instance, the recent 
Japanese experience shows that, despite the presence of a large negative output-gap for most of the period 
1991-2002, inflation turned negative in the second half of the 1990s but, after 1998, core inflation remained 
stable at moderately negative levels reaching its trough at -0.79 percent in 2002. 
 
7 Indeed, the high volatility of the “neutral” interest rate explains, at least partly, the practical difficulties 
encountered by researchers when attempting to estimate it (see Weber et al., 2008).  
 
8 Carroll and Samwick (1998) regress household’s wealth on two different measures of uncertainty and find 
substantial evidence that households engage in precautionary saving. In particular, they find that setting the 
uncertainty of every household to the smallest predicted uncertainty for every household would reduce total 
net worth of households under 50 by about 45%; would reduce their net worth exclusive of housing and 
business equity by 50%; and would reduce their holdings of liquid assets by 32%. 
  
9 See Romer (1996, pp. 333-6) for a graphical illustration of the implications of an increase in income 
uncertainty when the marginal utility function is convex.  
 
10 Wicksell (1911 [1958, p. 181]) discusses the possibility of a negative “natural” rate of interest when 
agents expect a lower real income in the future.  
 
11 Ferderer (1993) provides supportive empirical evidence for the hypothesis that, after controlling for 
accelerator effects and the cost of capital, increased uncertainty induces firms to postpone irreversible 
investment expenditures. 
 
12 Some prominent PK contributions on this topic are the studies in Dymski (1992), Wray (1991), Lavoie 
(1996), Neal (1996) and Wolfson (1996).  
  
13 We view the New Keynesian literature on credit rationing stemming from the seminal work by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) as focusing on the factors that determine which borrowers are denied credit at a given 
point in time as opposed to the PK literature that is mainly concerned with the change over time in the 
amount of credit rationing for all borrowers.  
   
14 Guttentag and Herring (1984) explain the eventual occurrence of this dissonance as the result of a 
psychological mechanism they call “disaster myopia” whereby there is a systematic tendency for subjective 
probabilities to fall below actual probabilities during periods in which no major shocks occur. According to 
them, this mechanism explains why capital positions tend to decline in the upswing and creditors become 
more vulnerable to shocks that imperil their solvency.   
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15 Canzoneri et al. (2008) compare a “standard” NC model with no banks and monetary aggregates with a 
similar “enlarged” model endowed with banks that create deposits and make loans. Along other features, 
the “enlarged” model brings a role for government bonds in household and bank liquidity, and provides an 
endogenous spread between the money market rate and the rate of return in the representative agent utility 
function that depends mainly upon the fiscal target for the ratio of government bonds to GDP. However, 
other key features of the standard NC model like perfect foresight and the absence of default risk remain.   
 
16 We may also note that a fundamental implication of the “life-cycle theory of saving” is that the saving 
rate depends positively on the long-term rate of income growth (Modigliani and Cao, 2004).  
 
17 By contrast, the usual neoclassical justification of a significant and positive interest-elasticity of saving is 
based on the existence of a “wealth” effect that operates in the same direction as the “substitution” effect 
and thus swamps the potential offsetting impact stemming from the “income” effect (Summers, 1981).   
 
18 Deflation gives agents an incentive to delay consumption expenditures in order to benefit from lower 
future prices. In addition, a negative inflation rate may affect aggregate demand adversely if lower prices 
increase net-debtors´ real debt burden since the latter have a higher propensity to spend than net-creditors 
(see Palley, 2008).  
 
19 Empirical studies for the U.S. economy show that actual capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector 
fluctuates around 82 percent in the long run. This lends support to the notion that firms exhibit a stable 
“desired” rate of capacity utilization in the long run (Garner, 1994; Corrado and Mattey, 1997).  
 
20 The absence of the real interest rate as an argument in the investment function stems from the fact that 
empirical studies normally find that there is no significant relationship between long-term real interest rates 
and investment once we control for accelerator and cash-flow effects (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 310).  
  
21 Presumably, an inflation-targeting CB will tend to set the actual real interest rate below the “neutral” 
interest rate when current inflation is below target inflation and vice-versa.  
    
22 It must be noted that the uniqueness of the “neutral” interest rate is an implication of the existence of a 
unique (short-run) “inflation barrier” as enshrined in the CIER. Of course, the presence of hysteresis effects 
would lead to changes in the CIER over time and, hence, to changes in the “neutral” interest rate.     
 
23 According to Nakatani and Skott (2007), the low Japanese “natural” rate of growth is the result of the 
negative rate of growth of the labor force due to adverse demographic trends and to a low rate of growth of 
productivity owing to the exhaustion of the technological catch-up phase. They argue that the low “natural” 
growth rate generates a low profit share on capital and, hence, a low desired rate of accumulation, and refer 
to this situation as a “structural” LT. Likewise, low “potential” growth and a (secularly) high aggregate 
saving rate are, according to Krugman (1998, p. 173), crucial factors behind the recent Japanese stagnation.  
 
24 This is typically justified by the presence of “learning by doing” effects, induced technical change, 
changes in participation rates, and migration (see, for instance, León-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002).     
